phenomenological concept of the world), death, the death of the other, survival, melancholy, mourning, solitude, and resurrection. What can be learned from these writings can be summarised all too quickly as follows: There is no such thing as the One universal world that is shared by all; the world is not that within which all beings live or what they inhabit, the intersubjective accomplishment of a transcendental ego or the horizon against which everything is supposed to occur; death marks every time the absolute end of the world; the death of the other entails the disappearance of the world, marking, every time, each time singularly, the absolute end of the one and only world, the end of the world. To state this boldly: for Derrida, whatever we are to understand by 'world' is determined out of, determined from, determined by 'death'-the death of the other. Derrida's writings force us to think the notion of 'world' starting from, out of, or on behalf of, the other. In other words, we are forced to rethink the very thought of the world on the basis of, setting out from, 'ich muss dich tragen'. 4 Moreover, in his various remarks on Celan's poem, Derrida reformulates what may advisedly be called the 'mortal' condition as 'carrying the other in me'. In his meditations on the verb tragen, particularly in Celan and in Heidegger, and on porter, to carry, to bear, to wear, Derrida places a great emphasis on the experience of carrying the other in oneself. At both ends of life's spectrum, at birth and at death, I carry or bear the other in myself. For the mother, in the experience of carrying a child before birth, Die Welt is fort, the world disappears-it is far away. For the one who mourns and endures the melancholy of a loss, what is left is to carry or bear the other. That is the survivor's condition: to live with the melancholy of the end of the world.
In speaking about the end of the world, I am following a path, which may by now be considered well-trodden, a trail already expertly blazed by the remarkable analyses of Michael Naas, Rodolphe Gasché, Ginette Michaud, Geoffrey Bennington, J. Hillis Miller, and Peggy Kamuf, each of whom has, in his or her own way, helped us better understand Derrida's very curious formulation 'the end of the world'. 5 From the first encounter between us there is melancholy, the melancholy that one day death will separate us. We know, we are aware, that one of us will have to go before the other, leaving the other alone. But mourning does not wait for death, its implacable temporality of the future anterior dictates that one of us will have been 'dedicated [voué] ' (B, 22) to carry the other, to carry 'the world after the end of the world' (B, 23/140).
For, as Derrida writes in Rams, death is not, as we customarily think, the end of a world, 'the end of someone or something in the world', the end of one world among others but the absolute end of the one and only world. Each time, each time singularly, death is nothing other than the end of the world (B, 23/140). Death marks, each and every time, the end of the one and only world, the very world that 'each one [chacun] opens as the origin of the world' (B, 23/140).
The world is gone. It is no more. The world died; it ended. But what was the world? Has there ever been such a thing as the world? Which world?
References to 'earth and sky (ouranos)' in Archaic Greece, 'the order of all things' (kosmos) in Homer, 'the totality of all that is (holon, panta, ta panta)' in Hesiod and Heraclitus, and the use of all three terms holon, ouranos, kosmos in Plato, determined the conception of what later became known as 'the world' (mundus). With the advent of Christianity, the world came to be viewed as the terrestrial 'globe', designating the world of human beings or living beings, or regarded as synonymous with the entire 'universe' (universum). Leibniz went as far as claiming that there are many worlds. Colloquially, the English word 'world' can refer to a milieu, for example as in Tolkien's 'world' or Monet's 'world', while philosophically speaking, the concept of 'the world' has its own history or genealogy from Kant and Schopenhauer to the phenomenology of Husserl, Fink, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre. As does the thought of the end of the world, which aside from its apocalyptic connotations plays a very significant role in the writings of many contemporary thinkers, for example Levinas, and Blanchot.
What is the world? The world 'has at least as a minimal sense the designation of that within which [ce dans quoi]' all living beings are born, live, inhabit and die (BS II, 365/264). It is said that all living beings inhabit a common world-the same world-the world that they cohabit as inhabitants, for whom it serves as the common horizon. The world is also considered to be 'an order of ends, a juridical, moral, political order, an international order'. Having briefly established Derrida's views on the world, one path to take would be to pursue the philosophical notion of the world in order to show how Derrida's differs from its phenomenological predecessors (for whom the world forms the horizon). But perhaps a more interesting approach would be to explore the deconstruction of the world through a discussion of the end of the world. In retrospect, we can say that this is exactly what was taking place in Derrida's last seminar The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II (2002-3) , devoted in part to Heidegger's 1929 Heidegger's /1930 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, that is, the meticulous but utter reformulation, revaluation, in other words, deconstruction of each of the terms of its subtitle: world, finitude, solitude. There, through a silent reading of the last line of Celan's poem, each of the three terms of Heidegger's lecture course is thoroughly worked over and re-interpreted by Derrida.
The world is gone. The world is no more and the survivor remains alone. The survivor remains 'before [en-deça] and beyond the world' of the other-before the world itself. (B, 23/140) On this side, below, and 'before' the world because with the other's death there is no world, the world is gone and 'beyond' because [ On a first reading there seems to be a radical heterogeneity between the two clauses of the last line of the poem. What demonstrable link can there be between them? Michael Naas (233) and Ginette Michaud have both emphasised the chiasmatic structure of the last line, Celan's double proposition that contains a constative (it's the end of the world) and a performative (a commitment, a promise, an oath, a duty, an 'inflexible injunction': I must carry you). But if it is end of the world, why must I still carry you? 'When the world is no more (n'est plus), when it has gone far away [ In spoken German, tragen refers to the experience of carrying a child prior to its birth. Derrida glosses this further as he puts a twist on Levinas's notion of 'the other in me': 'Between the mother and the child, the one in the other and the one for the other, in this singular couple of solitary beings, in the shared solitude between one and two bodies, the world disappears' (B, 72/159). The world is far away for the mother who carries the child. As well as speaking the language of birth, tragen can also be addressed to the dead, to the survivor or to their specter in the same experience of carrying the other in the self. I keep the other in me in mourning, something that I was already doing while the other was still living. According to Derrida, 'I welcome in me, I take into myself this end of the world, I must carry the other and the other's world, the world in me: introjection, interiorisation of memory (Erinnerung), idealisation' (B, 74/160). 'But if I must (and this is ethics itself) carry the other in myself in order to be faithful to that other, to respect its singular alterity, a certain melancholia must still protest against normal mourning' (B, 74/160, trans. mod.). Melancholia is necessary so that I do not keep the other within myself, as myself.
The world is gone; it is in retreat. In Rams Derrida addresses the Husserlian-inspired thought of the annihilation of the world (Weltvernichtung), referring to this 'retreat [retrait]' of the world to 'the point of the possibility of its annihilation' as 'the most insane experience of a transcendental phenomenology' (B, 74/160). In §49 of Ideas I Husserl explains that 'access to the absolute egological consciousness' necessitates the suspension of the existence of the transcendent world in a radical epokhē' (B, 75/161). The hypothesis of the annihilation of the world does not only threaten the sphere of pure egological experience but also opens access to this sphere. According to Derrida, Celan's poem 'pushes to its limit the experience of the possible annihilation of the world', that is, 'its sense for "me", for a pure ego' (B, 75/161). But in this solitude of the pure ego, the alter ego that is 'constituted in the ego is no longer accessible in an originary intuition'. The alter ego can be constituted 'only by analogy, by appresentation, indirectly, inside of me, who then carries it there where there is no longer a transcendent world' (B, 76/161). 'I must then carry it, carry you, there were the world gives way [se dérobe]' (B, 76/161) . This is my responsibility; but I can only carry you without appropriating you to myself. This carrying can no longer mean to include or comprehend the other in oneself; [but rather,] 'to bear oneself toward [se porter vers] the infinite inappropriability of the other,' 'in me outside of me' (B, 76/161). I can only be 'starting from this strange, dislocated bearing [portée disloquée] of the infinitely other in me' (B, 76/161) . Highlighting the plurivocity of the dich in the last line of Celan's poem, Derrida writes that 'I must carry the other, and carry you, the other must carry me', 'even there where the world is no longer between us or beneath' us (B, 76/161). My solitude is such that 'I am alone with the other . . . without world' 'wherever the "I must" . . . forever prevails over the "I am"' (B, 76/161).
A few months after giving the talk on Gadamer, in the Foreword to Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde (published in October 2003). Derrida claims: 'the death of the other, not only but especially if one loves the other [surtout si on l'aime]', does not simply declare the 'absence,' the 'disappearance [disparition], the end of this or that life', in other words 'the possibility for a world (always unique) to appear to a given living being' (CFU, 9, first emphasis mine). 7 Rather, 'death declares each time the end of the world entirely [en totalité], the end of every possible world, and each time the end of the world as a unique, and thus singular, and thus infinite, totality ' (CFU, 9) .
The death of the other is 'as if the repetition of the end of an infinite whole [d'un tout infini] were still possible: the end of the world itself, the only world there is, every time. Singularly, irreversibly'. (CFU, 9) It is as if this end of the world were possible 'for the other and in a strange way also for the provisional survivor who endures its impossible experience' (CFU, 9). It is as if every time the repetition of the death of another-the end of the world itself, the only world there iswere possible. What is referred to as an 'impossible experience' is this aporetic experience of the repetition of the end of the world (each time the end and then its repetition).
As Rodolphe Gasché observes, 'to repeat the unique disappearance of the one and only world after the death of an other also means that in every singular case in which a death occurs, and one world (which is also the world itself) disappears, there is no more return of the world itself.' 8 And this is how Derrida defines 'the world', showing that its meaning is entirely derived from death: 'That is what "the world" would mean. This meaning is conferred on it only by what is called "death".' (CFU, 9) The other does not come back. There is no more return of the world. The death of a singular other confronts the survivor with 'the always open possibility, indeed the necessity of a possible nonreturn', the necessity that non-return be possible. This 'necessity of the possibility of non-return', this end of the world, signals the end of all resurrection (CFU, 11, my emphasis). 9 Commenting on Nancy's notion of resurrection, what Derrida finds troubling is that 'anastasis postulates both the existence of some God and that the end of the world will not be the end of the world'. (CFU, 11) As Derrida explains, 'God' means: death can put an end to a world, it would not be the end of the world. A world, one world can always survive another. There is more than one world. More than one possible world [or: more than one world possible-un monde possible]. That is what we would wish to believe, as little as we believe or believe to believe in 'God.' However, 'death, death itself, if there is such a thing', acts as a countermeasure against this thought of God, insofar as it leaves no room [aucune place], not the least chance [pas la moindre chance], for the replacement or for the survival of the sole and unique world, of the 'sole and unique' that makes of each living being (animal, human, or divine), a sole and unique living being. (CFU, 11) That the other does not come back spells the end of all resurrection.
After Derrida's writings on the end of the world we can no longer accept the definition of the world as the totality of what there is. The world cannot be thought of as an all-encompassing, universal totality to be grasped synoptically or viewed from a satellite as a globe. 10 Rather, the world is that which is uniquely opened up by the other, the totality of what is for a unique 'being' that being's world, and what comes to an end upon the other's death.
The discussion of 'the end of the world' can be linked to one of the terms or tropes appearing regularly in Derrida's later seminars-the abyss. The effect of the reading of the end of the world presented above, beyond its significance on death, the other, mourning, melancholy, world, solitude, resurrection, and so on, could be explored on Derrida's almost contemporaneous reading of the notion of Grund (ground, principle, axiom, etc.) in Heidegger, a reading that Derrida takes up over a number of his seminars, for example the Death Penalty Seminar and The Beast and the Sovereign. Why would such a reading be important? 11 Being for Heidegger is ground, a point that he underscores on a number of occasions. As he writes in 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking': 'Since the beginning of philosophy and with that beginning, the Being of beings [das Sein des Seiendes] has showed itself as the ground (archē, aition, principle), has been considered as ground. The ground is that from which beings as such are what they are in their becoming, perishing, and persisting.' 12 Being is the ultimate ground. Grund may be archē, beginning or first principle, but it is certainly not the cause. Thus, for Heidegger, Being as Grund is not being as ratio but a ground without ground. The ground is an Ab-grund, an abyss; however, with this Ab-grund, Derrida suggests, Heidegger is still positing some form of ground-an originary ground (Urgrund) that is also a non-ground (Ungrund) underlying everything. The abyss, then, still seems to belong to some primordial Urgrund. 13 In contrast, for Derrida, a consideration of ground is not an ontological matter. Each and every other constitutes a ground, rests on a ground. Consequently, with the death of every other, a world goes away; the ground gives way and is lost. 
